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A Single Civil Procedure for Europe :
A Cathedral Builders’ Dream
Marcel STORME?
It is in the context of the internationalisation of procedural law on the one hand, and
that of the quest for straightforward, effective, rapid and low-cost court proceedings on the
other hand, that the report submitted by the working party which I had the honour to
chair must be located.
With very limited resources and lacking any logistical assistance whatsoever, but
making grateful use of the help volunteered by the highly-quali ed members of this
working party, we were able to present to the European Commission a report containing
16 proposed directives seeking to achieve harmonisation among the systems of procedural
law which apply in the in those days 12 EU member states.
Thanks to a comparative survey of the various systems of procedural law, we
succeeded in identifying similarities and areas of agreement which have allowed us to
propose a certain set of measures, having obtained world-wide and anonymous consent for
this project from the members of this working party.
In my introductory general report, to which I refer in this acticle, I emphasised the
urgent need for the approximation of European procedural law and outlined the methods
by which this objective could be achieved??. I would, however, also refer to the Report on
civil procedures in EC countries which was drawn up at the request of the Tokyo Marine
and Fire Insurance Co:??
The fact that there are very marked differences in civil court procedures will continue
to undermine the purpose of European Community directives both as to the speed at
which they are implemented by member states and as to their enforcement .
Having located procedural law in general, and European judicial law in particular, in its
proper context, it is appropriate to take stock of the current position and to identify those
factors which could shape future developments.
At this point, I would make two observations which could usefully serve as a starting
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point.
1. When the working party which I chaired commenced operations in 1987, any notion
of uni cation, or even harmonisation, was out of the question, or at least deemed to
be inconceivable
2. At the European level, the only available instruments were the 1950 European
Convention on Human Rights and the 1968 Brussels Convention.
The Storme Commission’s report was submitted in early 1993, which seemed to mark
the end of a daring adventure. The report was commented upon, examined and criticised
at a number of conferences and symposia. From the Commission, however, no reaction
was forthcoming.
Then, without warning, the Green Paper of 20/12/2002 emphatically stated that
the Storme proposal provides an extremely valuable frame of reference and a source
of inspiration (Com (2002) 746 nal, p. 15).
It now appears that even in EU circles it is accepted that the harmonisation of procedural
law is desirable, necessary and achievable.
However, this does not tell the whole story. It was the Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam
(1997) and Tampere (1999) agreements which provided the building blocks for an
embryonic system of European procedural law, thanks to the various regulations which
have been adopted over the past three years, as well as the proposals which are currently
on the drawing board. ??
We should rst of all recall that it was at Maastricht that the High Contracting Parties
reaf rmed
their objective to facilitate the free movement of persons, while ensuring the safety
and security of their peoples, by including provisions on justice and home affairs in this
Treaty
It is this that gave rise to the construction of three pillars, the third of which related to co-
operation in the elds of justice and domestic affairs.
However, the Treaty of Amsterdam had the effect of transferring judicial co-operation
from the third pillar to the rst. The new Article 65 constitutes a fundamental provision in
this regard, stating as it does that measures in the eld of judicial co-operation in civil
matters having cross-border implications include:
improving and simplifying
the system for cross-border service of judicial and extra-judicial documents,
co-operation in the taking of evidence,
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the recognition and enforcement of decisions in civil and commercial cases,
including decisions in extra-judicial cases
promoting the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States
concerning the con ict of laws and jurisdiction;
eliminating obstacles to the good functioning of civil proceedings, if necessary by
promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the
Member States .
Since the adoption of this text, several initiatives have been taken in the eld of civil
proceedings. In common with Guinchard, Douchy, Bandrac and Lagarde, ?? professor
Hakim Boularbah?? proposes a highly appropriate distinction between the procedural law
relating to instruments of co-operation, European judicial law and common procedural law.
In the rst instance, there are those instruments which, in essence, seek to establish a
rigid and organised framework aimed at facilitating and reinforcing judicial co-operation
and information amongst the courts and authorities of the member states. This has
essentially served to regulate the principle of co-operation and information, as well as
practical details such as the use of languages, court costs, forms and databases, without
actually giving rise to any rules of procedural law. The object of the exercise is not to
harmonise the internal procedural laws of the member states, but to organise the relations
between the courts and the appropriate authorities of each of the member states. The
national systems of procedural law largely continue to apply to all matters relating to the
practical implementation of the various measures on co-operation.
However, we are also witnessing the gradual emergence of a European body of
procedural law. This may be speci cally applicable to cross-border court disputes,
regulating such matters as serving court documents abroad, collecting evidence in other
countries, or discovering the international scope or the effects of foreign court decisions.
This body of law may also govern all domestic procedures, regardless of any transnational
character which they may have.
Finally, thanks to a number of Community instruments and initiatives, but above all
on the basis of the fundamental principles of the European Union more particularly the
right to a fair trial it has been possible to achieve a system of procedural law which is
common to the member states.
Without going into too much detail, I would recall the main instruments to have been
adopted in these elds.
The rst category, i.e. judicial cooperation, contains the regulations dealing with
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serving court documents collecting evidence: Council regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 of 29
May 2000 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in
civil or commercial matters and Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on
cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or
commercial matters.
It can be said that these regulations facilitate certain procedures, but can in no way be
considered to have laid down rules of European procedural law which could replace
domestic rules on court proceedings. It should also be recalled that these regulations
present considerable gaps for example in relation to the double date phenomenon. ??
There is also Council Directive 2002/8/EC of 27 January 2003 to improve access to
justice in cross-border disputes by establishing minimum common rules relating to legal aid
for such disputes.
Personally, I do not believe that this directive adds a great deal to the Convention of
The Hague of 25/10/1980.
Council Regulation (EC) No 743/2002 of 25 April 2002 establishing a general
Community framework of activities to facilitate the implementation of judicial cooperation
in civil matters, for its part, constitutes the instrument for planning the action essentially
in the areas of scienti c research, publications and seminars covered by Article 65.
The second category contains certain instruments which create a number of rules of
European judicial law in relation to cross-border disputes such as Council Regulation
(EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement
of judgments in civil and commercial matters, which replaces the 1968 Brussels
Convention, Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency
proceedings, Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 of 29 May 2000 on the service in the
Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters, and
Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental
responsibility for children of both spouses. ??
As has already been mentioned, a Green Paper has recently been published by the
European Commission (20/12/2002). This makes provision for a European payment order
procedure, as well as measures seeking to simplify and accelerate the settlement of disputes
which concern modest amounts of money (small claims).
In order to guarantee access to a system of effective administration of justice in each
of the member states, the Commission intends in the rst instance to create a uniform or
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at least harmonised European payment order procedure. The Commission has in mind
the creation of a procedure which would apply in parallel with ordinary national
procedures, and which would only govern the rst, unilateral, stage of the proceedings
rather than the subsequent stages in the event where the debtor challenges the debt owed.
Moreover, if we start from the assumption that it is often in connection with disputes
relating to modest sums of money that the incompatible or complex nature of the member
states’ legal and judicial systems discourage or prevent citizens and businesses from
enforcing their rights, the Commission also proposes to seek the harmonisation of national
judicial law by laying down procedural rules relating to claims for small amounts.
As is acknowledged by the Commission, the harmonisation of procedures or the
creation of a European procedure for the collection of uncontested debts or the settlement
of disputes relating to modest amounts of money will, in reality, be the rst initiatives in
the eld of civil judicial co-operation directly concerning the rules that govern the
procedure to obtain an enforceable decision . ?? If they are adopted, these measures will,
for the rst time, create common judicial rules capable of leading to a verdict in all
disputes, including cases of a purely domestic nature. ??
Finally, a system of common European procedural law could emerge from the
fundamental principles of the European Union, such as those contained in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter No. 2000/C634/01 of 18/12/2000).
This Charter seeks to guarantee an effective remedy before a court of law whilst at the
same time restating the guarantees contained in Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights.
Article 47(1) and (2) of the said Charter is worded as follows:
Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated
has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the
conditions laid down in this Article.
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have
the possibility of being advised, defended and represented.
This constitutes a common procedural right which contains three guarantees: the guarantee
of access to a court; procedural guarantees (reasonable time, fair trial, independent and
impartial proceedings and impartial judge), and the guarantee that the court’s decision will
be enforced. The last-named guarantee is the outcome of recent court decisions by the
Strasbourg court (see in particular Hornsby v. Greece dated19/3/1997, Perez de Rada
Camilles v. Spain dated 28/10/1998 and Estima Jorg v. Portugal dated 21/4/1998).
Personally, I remain convinced that the non-discrimination principle (Article 12 EC
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Treaty) should become the guiding principle behind the harmonisation of procedural law
within the European Union. However, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) mistakenly
restricts the discrimination principle to discrimination in domestic law as between nationals
and the citizens of another member state.
It is clear that any business which establishes itself in a member state will encounter
discrimination in the eld of court proceedings where it compares the latter to proceedings
as they apply in other member states.
It follows from the foregoing that the uni cation of civil proceedings within the
European Union may no longer be a dream, but remains far from a satisfactory reality.
Nevertheless, the wording of certain provisions already anticipate the successful
emergence of a common system of judicial law within the European Union.
The European Council conference at Tampere referred to
a genuine area of justice must ensure that individuals and businesses can approach
courts and authorities in any Member State as easily as in their own and not be
prevented or discouraged from exercising their rights by the complexity of the legal
and administrative systems in the Member States (COM (2002) 261 nal, p. 30).
The criticisms which could be levelled at the manner in which approximation is being
achieved in the area of civil procedure can be summarised as follows.
1. The Commission lacks a coherent vision of the fundamental importance of
procedural law for the European Union.
This was already my considered view when my working party submitted its report in
1993. It is only 10 years later that this report was expressly cited (Green Paper of
20/12/2002).
I do not intend to lay the blame for this at the Commission’s door, since for over 40
years procedural law was regarded as an area which fell outside the ambit of Community
decision-making.
It is this factor which explains the minimalist attitude adopted by the Commission and
the Council, which were of the opinion that
if the establishment of minimum guarantees appears to be insuf cient, discussions
should be directed towards a certain degree of harmonisation of the procedures . ???
2. The absence of a coherent attitude is re ected in the vertical approach adopted
towards the harmonisation of procedural law, ??? i.e. subject-by-subject harmonisation,
instead of a horizontal approach which would
ensure that individuals and businesses can approach courts and authorities in any
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Member State as easily as in their own and not be prevented or discouraged from
exercising their rights by the complexity of the legal and administrative systems in the
Member States ???
Such a horizontal approach towards approximation would also enable the EU to avoid
any weakening, even if only potential, of the uniform application and interpretation
of Community law throughout the Union would be liable to give rise to distortions of
competition and discrimination between economic operators, thus jeopardizing
equality of opportunity as between those operators and consequently the proper
functioning of the internal market . ???
It is necessary to guarantee the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, as developed by
the European Court of Justice, ??? in relation to court procedure. Prof. A.M Van den
Bossche summarises the position in the following terms:
Since the European Communities are communities founded on the rule of law, and
since the Union, being based on them, shares this characteristic, it would be
inappropriate to remove from the outset the fundamental, and more general, question
as to whether the divergent nature of the rules on court procedure between the
member states, which govern the procedures of the ordinary courts, is conducive
towards guaranteeing access to justice, as well as equivalent and effective legal
protection in all member states, or whether it is instead such as to prevent and
dissuade citizens from claiming and enforcing their rights. If it is intended to reach a
coherent and convincing solution, it will be necessary to adopt a horizontal approach,
seeking to put into place a European "common core" in the eld of procedural law. ???
3. It is obvious that harmonisation should not be restricted to cross-border disputes,
for why should such cases take precedence over national disputes ?
Naturally, it is possible to conceive of alternative European procedures running
parallel with national procedures, but this would need to be a transitional system.
Why harmonise ?
It is certainly the case that the European Union requires uni cation/harmonisation, not
only in relation to international or transnational disputes, ??? but also, and especially,
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because the "lawyers’ law" has also become the most appropriate instrument for those
lawyers who give advice or act in court in cases which transcend national borders.
On the other hand, I also take the view that harmonisation at the European level
could also inspire attempts at harmonising civil proceedings at the worldwide level. ???
Harmonising yes, but how ?
Whilst preparing our nal report for 1993, I started to re ect on the various methods
of unifying the law in the European Union. In this connection, twelve years ago I set
about analysing the legal thinking and practice which prevailed in the 18th century.18)
The 18th century featured and combined every conceivable approach towards legal
sources, so that the debate surrounding the question as to which of these sources should
enjoy supremacy, which already took place in those times, can even today continue to
inspire re ection on legal uni cation in Europe.
This proposition can be illustrated by referring to three jurists, born in the 18th
century, who have left their indelible stamp on the manner in which the law has developed
since those times, and who are representative of the three major legal traditions which
have dominated, and continue to dominate, European legal thinking, to wit the German,
French and Anglo-Saxon traditions, each having assessed and de ned from their different
perspectives (these differences sometimes owing more to appearance than to reality) the
manner in which the law was created. These three gures are Lord Mans eld, Portalis and
Von Savigny. They made reference to the case law, legislation and the leading writers.
To these categories should be added as does Rodolfo Sacco the unwritten law of
civil procedure, i.e. the custom and practice of our law courts.
Lord Mans eld is the very incarnation of the judge who considers that the best way in
which to adapt the law to changing times is for the courts to reshape age-old principles and
rules in order to adapt them to new circumstances.
Portalis, on the other hand, in his renowned discours preliminaire , emphasised how
desirable it was, in his view, that everything should be regulated by statute. He was
equally rm in his conviction that legislation cannot regulate everything, and that there was
therefore plenty of scope for interpretation and application of the law by the courts. In
exceptional cases, the latter should even be allowed on certain occasions to ll certain gaps
in the law.
Finally, Von Savigny undoubtedly continues to be the ultimate representative of the
contribution made by legal writing to the development of the law. He envisaged a
substantial contribution by the leading writers in order to clarify and perfect the law as
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contained in legislation, using theoretical and scienti c methods. However, Von Savigny
was in reality an opponent, not of codi cation itself, but of bad codi cation, because the
latter meant that the law would be dominated by other fundamental principles existing
outside the code. ???
The preference which I expressed in the said paper for a comparison between the case
law has in the meantime been realised in part thanks to the ius commune project
(Maastricht) and thanks also to the creation of a journal of comparative case law which
was launched in Ghent in 1992 under the leadership of Ewoud Hondius end myself, in the
shape of the European Review of Private L aw (Revue Europeenne de Droit Prive,
Europaisches Z eitschrift fur Privatrecht).
I have to confess that I am currently becoming increasingly aware of the richness
inherent in the comparative study available literature on the subject of judicial law. It
enables us to discover not only the diversity of the various academic and practical
approaches adopted in the eld of procedural law, but also to discuss the need to replace
this diversity by as much unity as possible: e diversitate unitas. ???
This is why I have for some time now decided to make the case for a more explicit
comparative analysis of the available literature in the various areas of procedural law (see
more particularly the Civil Procedure in Europe series under the leadership of Messrs.
Meyknecht, Van Rhee and Storme. The following works have already been published in
this series: Seizure and Overindebtedness in the European Union; Recourse against
Judgments in the European Union; Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
outside the scope of the Brussels and L ugano Conventions, under press Evidence.
It would be extremely useful to take the initiative of assembling the procedural
specialists belonging to the various schools of judicial law in Continental Europe in order
to re ect on the possibility of a common approach by the literature towards procedural
law, i.e. a common doctrine for Europe, common principles of procedural law in Europe.
I would draw your attention particularly to the fact that I have expressly focused on
the Continental approach towards procedural law. The reason why I proposed this
restriction is not that English is not spoken on the Continent, except in Gibraltar, but that
I believe it to be more appropriate to stake out the eld for a common Continental
approach and, once such an approach had been conceived, we could meet our common law
colleagues in order to discover those points which the Continental procedural law and the
common law of procedure have in common.
The leading writers will be required to formulate the general principles of civil
procedure, i.e. the fundamental principles which constitute the basis of equitable court
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proceedings within the meaning of the fair trial principle of Article 6 of the European
Convention, i.e. a trial which seeks to achieve the relevant objective, which is a rapid,
equitable, truthful and enforceable judgment.
I do not believe that the general principles of law can by themselves make a useful
contribution towards harmonisation in Europe. It should, however, be added that there
are general principles of European law which could play a unifying role, such as for
example the non-discrimination principle. However, as has already been emphasised
earlier, this principle has wrongly been restricted to domestic rules of civil procedure. ???
Nevertheless, the European citizen is entitled to a uniform system of judicial protection
within the European Union. This is why an attempt at reaching consensus on certain
principles should be made. When comparing the current situation with that which was
written 400 years ago by the Bruges lawyer Joost de Damhouder in his work Praktycke in
civiele zaken (court practice in civil matters), we will see that the complaints made in those
days (1560) can be compared with those made famous by our late colleague Sir Jack Jacob,
who explained that our civil procedure was dominated by a three-headed hydra: delays,
cost and vexation . This is why it is necessary to ask the question whether we have not
advocated general principles which are inadequate for the purpose of successfully
conducting civil proceedings. This is also why it is necessary to replace certain principles
by opposite principles, and, on the other hand, to rede ne certain principles or to add
others.
1. Opposite principles
a. Judicial activism should replace the principle of judicial neutrality, which has often
been wrongly interpreted as judicial passivity. In the report which I submitted to the
Conference of our International Association at Coimbra in 1991, not only did I advocate
such judicial activism, but I also proved that we are inexorably moving in that direction.
The most striking current example of this trend is de nitely the fundamental idea
expressed by Lord Woolf whilst preparing the reforms which he sought to introduce in
England and Wales:
Without effective control, however, the adversarial process is likely to encourage an
adversarial culture and to degenerate into an environment in which the litigation
process is too often seen as a battle eld where no rules apply
Such activism should lead to a very clear division of labour between the parties and the
judge: the dispute belongs to the parties, whereas the trial belongs to the judge. This
means that the parties are required to present facts and arguments, whereas the judge must
direct the trial it is he who will decide the various time limits, organise the probation
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procedure, call for the intervention of third parties and determine the legal foundations of
the dispute.
b. For many centuries, we have been living under a system which placed the heaviest
procedural burden on the claimant’s shoulders. It was for the latter to commence the
action, advance court costs, arrange for the defendant to be advised, summons the latter
before the court of his place of residence, bear the burden of proof, advance the costs of
any expert examination, etc. It is high time for this burden to be reversed.
In Germany, the Mahnverfahren ensures that the creditor may, on unilateral
application, obtain the title which can subsequently be rebutted by the debtor against
whom the order was made. In France, there is talk of reversing the burden of litigation,
whereas in the Netherlands there are those who advocate also reversing the burden of
litigation. From the available statistical data, it can be seen that court actions stand a
better chance of succeeding than of failing. This inevitably prompts the conclusion that the
burden of the proceedings should be placed on the shoulders of the party who failed to
meet his contractual obligations, or who infringed the legal order. The claimant will be
issued with a title on the basis of a prima facie case, against which the defendant may
object in order to subject the case to the full court procedure.
A speci c application of this principle whereby the burden of litigation is reversed has
already been defended in connection with the dictum where there is no interest, there can be
no action. I have proposed that this dictum should be reversed to read where there is an
action, there is an interest. Those persons or associations which go to the trouble and
expense to bring an action related to, for example, diffuse rights (defence of the cultural
heritage, protection of the environment, etc.) should be presumed to be protecting an
interest and must accordingly be given access to the courts.
c. Although the Belgian Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation) and the international case
law of the Strasbourg Court have con rmed that the appealable nature of court decisions
does not constitute a general principle of law, I would add that appeals are indefensible per
se. Is it possible to make acceptable a decision made on appeal which differs from the rst
decision, in spite of the case involving the same parties, the same facts and the same
applicable law ?
The dispute should be settled in its entirety at rst and last instance, and the parties
should be required to conduct the entire dispute within the context of this sole instance.
Arbitration, which takes place over a single instance, can be invoked in support of this
thesis, as well as the statistical evidence that the majority of court actions are awarded to
the claimant. One can of course provide for a system of leave for appeal.
2. Certain principles must be rede ned
a. Public access to justice is a method of invigilation exercised by the community of
citizens, in the sense that justice must be seen to be done . In today’s world however, it
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is legitimate to ask the question whether such public accessibility should not be restricted
now that the media are indulging in the increasingly unacceptable practice of multiplying
court trials. Public access to the courts was decreed as a principle a long time before the
media came into existence. It was seen as a method of supervising on the part of the
neighbours, of the rural community, of the surrounding community, as a result of which
the courts had to operate under the watchful eye of the small community which prevailed
in those days. Today, however, we have evolved towards a system of justice dispensed by
the media, concerning which the words of Mauro Cappelletti continue to be perfectly
applicable where he made his famous pronouncement that the worst of all kinds of trial is
trial by newspapermen .
This rede nition of public access to the courts could nd a new application if the
countries of the European continent were to recognise the sub judice principle.
b. The principle of a fair trial must be regarded as one of the fundamental principles of
law, but nevertheless remains an extremely vague rule which results in too many trials
being conducted without the parties having sought the intervention of a public service, i.e.
the courts, in a manner which is correct and serious.
The latter observations should undoubtedly give a new dimension to the fundamental
principle of the need for a fair trial, and should prompt calls for a more adequate system of
penalising abuse of process. The courts should be allowed to apply this penalty without
the parties being required to make a speci c request to this effect. The power to do so as
of right would be in order because Niklas Luhmann’s Gesetz des Wiedersehens prevents
the lawyers from claiming abuse of process against each other.
c. Although it has not yet been possible to provide an exact de nition of the term
reasonable time limit , it is de nitely the case that the principle laid down in Article 6 of
the European Convention should become a compulsory guideline. It is therefore of the
utmost urgency to manage and dominate the time element of court proceedings. Justice is
the only industry whose production is not subject to the demands of timing.
d. The independence and impartiality of the courts are without the slightest doubt the
most essential fundamental principles of procedural law. Although it is not necessary to
rede ne this principle, it is useful to recall that justice is becoming increasingly expensive,
for the entire community as well as for the contending parties. In this connection, I would
cite the example of Costa Rican constitution, which lays down that 5 per cent of the
budget should be allocated to the administration of justice. This could put an end to the
corrupt practices which currently occur all too frequently in some nations of this world.
However, justice is also becoming too expensive for the contending parties, as a result
of court costs. It is the big law rms which have caused fees and costs to rise sky-high.
The lawyer is no longer paid by the page, as was the case in medieval times, but by the
six-minute period !
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3. Certain legal principles should be added to the current supply
Among proposals currently being mooted, there are some on which I entertain certain
doubts.
a. It is fashionable to believe that alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is capable of
resolving most, if not all, of the problems currently af icting the administration of justice.
I have my doubts on this subject because, on the one hand, I share Lord Devlin’s opinion
where he stated that injustice resided in the fact that certain disputes do not even succeed
in reaching the courts, and because, on the other hand, it is a fact that submitting all
disputes to the courts will inevitably result in obstructing the paths of justice.
b. It is de nitely the case that barristers are less involved in alternative dispute resolution
than they are in the proceedings before the state courts. As a result, there is a risk that
the fundamental principle of Waffengleichheit (equality of arms) will become dead letter.
c. It is obvious that the rights of the defence constitute an absolutely essential principle of
procedural law, which could also be reinforced by the right to be noticed and the right to
be heard. However, in this connection it should be emphasised that, since the end of
World War II, the rights of the defence have been strengthened to such an extent that they
have become a high-quality luxury item, in respect of which the words of Mauro
Cappelletti remain highly appropriate where he wrote at the end of his introductory
chapter to A ccess to Justice, citing Hooper, that
our judicial system, admirable though it may be, is at once slow and costly. It is a
nished product of great beauty, but entails an immense sacri ce of time, money and
talent .
?
? ?
By way of conclusion, I would emphasise that if it is possible to achieve a consensus on the
most important general principles of procedural law, it must also be possible to apply these
principles in a uniform manner within the European Union.
In order to achieve these objectives, it would appear that these general principles,
modi ed, rede ned or supplemented, should contain a certain promise of improving the
regulation of court proceedings, i.e. a system of rules promoting court proceedings which
are more rapid, less expensive and less burdensome. Only if this is realised will European
harmonisation stand a chance of succeeding.
We can draw some consolation from the fact that, at the level of a market which
functions well, one rule only submerges, i.e. the rule which is undoubtedly regarded by the
consumer as being the best. It is by applying this best practice standard that uni cation
will be achieved in Europe.
By way of conclusion, I would once again draw attention to the title of this paper: A
A Single Civil Procedure for Europe : A Cathedral Builders’ DreamR. L. R.
cathedral architect’s dream a single civil procedure for Europe .
Towards the end of January, on the occasion of the meeting of the Board of our
Association, I had the opportunity to visit the magni cent cathedral of Regensburg, the
city of residence of our colleague and friend Peter Gottwald. It is a magni cent example
of gothic architecture, but it was a work which it took three centuries to build. Walking
around this imperial city of Kyoto, I had the opportunity to visit also magni cent temples
the building of which took also a long time.
My conclusion is perfectly straightforward: the soul of a cathedral or temple architect
is needed to achieve the long-term uni cation of procedural law in Europe and elsewhere
in the world.
Ghent, 2/2/2004
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